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The unintended consequence of Financial Fair Play: An examination of competitive 
balance across five European football leagues 
Abstract 
Purpose 
This paper examines competitive balance in European football leagues before and after the 
inception of Financial Fair Play (FFP) regulations by UEFA in 2011, designed to bring about 
financial stability and improve competitive balance in the European game. 
Design/Methodology/Approach 
Our research focuses on the top division football leagues in England (English Premier 
League), Germany (Bundesliga), France (Ligue 1), Italy (Serie A) and Spain (La Liga). The 
paper is organised into two distinct time periods: pre FFP, comprising the six seasons 
between 2005/06 and 2010/11; and post-FFP, comprising the six seasons between 2011/12 
and 2016/17. The paper uses recognised measures of concentration and dominance to 
measure competitive balance. 
Findings 
The results show a statistically significant decline in competitive balance post-FFP for 
leagues in Spain, Germany and France but not for England and Italy. Furthermore, the results 
report significantly higher levels of concentration and dominance by a select number of clubs 
in Germany. 
Originality/Value 
The paper is one of the first to analyse competitive balance in this way both pre and post-
FFP. Whilst the paper cannot demonstrate a causal link between FFP and competitive 
balance, there are strong indications that competitive balance has been adversely affected (for 
some leagues) since the regulations have been imposed. To that end, the paper argues that 
FFP has had 'unintended consequences' in respect of competitive balance.  
Keywords 
Competitive balance; Financial Fair Play; European football; Competition; HICB; 
Dominance; UEFA.  
  
  
Introduction 
Against wider economic pressures, the European football market has grown exponentially 
over the course of the last two decades. A significant proportion of this growth is attributed to 
what is collectively known as the 'big five' leagues in European football, namely the English 
Premier League (England), Bundesliga (Germany), La Liga (Spain), Serie A (Italy) and 
Ligue 1 (France). Between them, these five leagues account for 54.5% of the total revenue 
generated by the whole market (€24.6billion). At the time of writing, the English Premier 
League sits comfortably above its main four rivals (from a revenue perspective) as the highest 
revenue generating league in European football, grossing €4.87 billion in 2015/16, over €2 
billion ahead of its nearest rival the Bundesliga in Germany (€2.71 billion), with Spain (€2.44 
billion), Italy (€1.92 billion) and France (€1.49 billion) lagging some way behind revenue list 
(Deloitte, 2017). 
 However, despite such increases in revenue, European football clubs have, in the past, 
found it difficult to balance the books. Indeed, at the turn of the last decade (2010), there was 
a growing concern about the financial plight of European club football with Storm and 
Nielsen (2012) stating that, despite ever-increasing revenues, clubs were still collectively 
failing to break-even. Net losses among the 734 European member clubs had increased by 
760% over the five-year period between 2006-2011 (Franck and Lang, 2013) and European 
club football had a substantial debt problem. 
 It was against this backdrop that the governing body of the sport, the Union of 
European Football Associations (UEFA), intervened and introduced financial regulations 
titled 'Financial Fair Play' (FFP). FFP was implemented in 2011 and was designed with two 
primary objectives in mind. The first was to provide a means through which to introduce 
discipline and rationality to club finances to help safeguard the stability of European football 
(UEFA, 2015). In essence, clubs were being told to spend within their means (hence the 
  
fundamental concept of 'break-even'). The second was the narrative that these regulations 
would enable the industry (and individual leagues) to become more competitively balanced. 
It is not clear whether or not the definition of competitive balance put forward by UEFA is 
aligned with the theoretical definition of competitive balance found in academic literature but 
it is evident that UEFA are indeed concerned with the concept of 'competition' between teams 
in their respective member leagues. It is still too early to suggest, empirically at least, that 
either objective is being met but there is some evidence that the general picture of financial 
performance is improving in some leagues linked to the first objective of FFP. Indeed, as 
financial regulations at both a European and domestic level continue to have an impact, in 
2015/16 only Ligue 1 and Serie A of the ‘big five’ leagues recorded aggregate operating 
losses (Deloitte, 2017). However, there is very little evidence at the present time as to the 
veracity of the achievement of the second objective of FFP in relation to competitive balance. 
 Furthermore, there has been extensive criticism of the regulations in academic 
literature, particularly linked to suggestions that the regulations may in fact have an adverse 
effect on competitive balance and only actually maintain the status quo of keeping the top 
clubs at the top of the game (e.g. Lindholm, 2010; Plumley, Wilson and Ramchandani, 2017; 
Sass, 2014; Szymanski, 2014). Indeed, the UEFA president himself, Aleksander Ceferin, 
stressed recently that "the biggest challenge [to develop football in Europe] over the next few 
years will be competitive balance" (Inside World Football, 2017), something which, in theory 
at least, the FFP regulations should be doing. 
 Consequently, this study aims to analyse these suggestions further, by examining the 
competitive balance of the 'big five' leagues in European football in a post-FFP climate. We 
focus our analysis on two important points. First, we examine the trend in competitive 
balance pre and post-FFP using recognised measures of competitive balance. Second, we 
examine a unique measure of competitive balance in relation to individual leagues - the level 
  
of dominance by a select number of clubs in terms of title wins and top four finishes (which 
usually means qualification for the flagship European football competition - the UEFA 
Champions League). Our paper contributes to both the academic and policy discussion 
surrounding this topic area and offers statistical insight into whether or not the FFP 
regulations have altered competitive balance in European football. 
 The rest of the paper is structured into the remaining sections. Next, the theoretical 
background and literature review is discussed before the methods section details the analysis 
undertaken. Following this, we present the empirical evidence from our study before 
discussing the implications and providing some concluding thoughts and recommendations 
for future research direction. 
Theoretical Background and Literature Review 
This section explores the existing body of literature related to the two main areas of enquiry 
based on the research aim; competitive balance and regulation in professional football. Both 
these areas can be traced to literature on the economic structure of professional team sports 
and the joint nature of production. Most of the theoretical literature in this area covers the 
debate between the operating objectives of North American versus European team sports 
leagues and this forms the conceptual framework for our study. However, a full review of this 
literature is not deemed necessary here as the discussion will be well known to scholars in the 
field. Readers are referred to Dobson and Goddard (2011), Leach and Szymanski (2015) and 
Wilson, Plumley and Barrett (2015) for confirmation of this received theory. 
 
Competitive Balance 
Professional team sports are intrinsically different from other businesses, in which a firm is 
likely to prosper if it can eliminate competition and establish a position as a monopoly 
  
supplier (Dobson and Goddard, 2011). In sport, however, it does not pay for one team to 
establish such a position due to the joint nature of 'production' in sports. It is this notion that 
fundamentally drives the concept of competitive balance in professional team sport leagues. 
Their structure and regulations may have implications for competitive balance and, in turn, 
the 'product'. Indeed, in relation to successful sport leagues, Groot (2008) stated that "each 
competitor has an inherent interest in maintaining the health of their rivals" (p. 25). A 
potential implication in this context is that an excessively imbalanced competition might have 
a negative effect on fan interest and, hence, on demand (Kesenne, 2006; Zimbalist, 2003). 
Narrative surrounding fan interest in relation to competitive balance has led to two distinct 
strands of academic literature as outlined by Fort and Maxcy (2003). They categorise the 
theoretical and empirical literature on competitive balance in terms of: (1) analysis of 
competitive balance (ACB) literature, which focuses on what has happened to competitive 
balance over time or as a result of changes in the business practices of sports leagues; and, (2) 
literature on competitive balance that analyses its effect on fans, i.e. which tests the 
longstanding uncertainty of outcome hypothesis (UOH). It is the first of these approaches (i.e. 
ACB) that this research is concerned with given the need to track ACB over time against FFP 
regulations. 
 Freestone and Manoli (2017) provide an overview of some of the angles of enquiry 
relating to competitive balance studies that focus on league organisation that have previously 
been studied including talent distribution (e.g. Kesenne, 2006; Winfree and Fort, 2012), 
salary caps (e.g. Dietl, Lang and Rathke, 2011; Maxcy and Millwood, 2018), number of 
opponents, and participation in international competitions (e.g. Pawlowski, Breuer and 
Hovemann, 2010). Naturally, given the origins of the concept of competitive balance, there 
have also been a number of studies that cover ACB in sport leagues in North America (for 
  
examples see: Lenten, 2015; Maxcy and Mondello, 2006; Mills and Fort, 2014; Price and 
Sen, 2003; Salaga and Fort, 2017; Zimbalist, 2002). 
 Previous research examining competitive balance in European football has almost 
exclusively focused on the aforementioned 'big five' leagues (England, France, Germany, 
Italy and Spain) and the findings present an inconclusive picture. For example, Goossens 
(2006) found no significant changes in competitive balance across the German, French and 
Spanish first divisions (1963/64 - 2004/05). Likewise, Groot (2008) presented similar 
findings for the French and Spanish first divisions (1946-2006). Michie and Oughton (2004) 
and Szymanski (2001) also found no significant changes in competitive balance in the French 
first division (1948-2004) and English first division (1978-1998) respectively. 
 Contrastingly, a number of other authors do report a decline in competitive balance in 
some European leagues, with some findings even being cited in the same studies above. For 
example Goossens (2006) found a decline in competitive balance in the English and Italian 
first divisions, whilst Groot (2008) reported similar findings for the English, German and 
Italian first divisions. Additionally, a number of more recent studies have stated a decline in 
competitive balance in the Spanish first division between 1928/29 - 2011/12 (Montes, Sala-
Garrido and Usai, 2014) and the English first division (both as an individual league over time 
and compared to the rest of the English football league industry (three other divisions) 
between 1992/93 - 2015/16 (Plumley, Wilson and Ramchandani, 2017)). This finding was 
partially influenced by the financial disparity between clubs in the EPL and the Football 
League. The financial disparity between clubs in the EPL and the Football League (in 
particular the Championship) and the impact on competitive balance has since been further 
confirmed by Wilson, Ramchandani and Plumley (2018) who found that parachute payments 
(payments paid to relegated clubs from the EPL) were having a negative impact on the 
overall competitive balance of the Championship between the years 2006/07 and 2016/17. 
  
 Hypothetically, a decline in competitive balance and an increase in financial disparity 
between clubs and leagues, could lead to a situation whereby a league is dominated by a 
select number of clubs. Indeed, there has already been evidence to suggest that this is 
potentially happening in the EPL in a paper by Curran, Jennings and Sedgwick (2009). Their 
paper focused more on measures of dominance to track competitive balance over time in the 
EPL. The authors formulated a “Top 4 Index” by counting the number of occasions that each 
team finished a league season in the top four places, summing the incidence of the four teams 
with the most occurrences and expressing the total as a proportion of the total number of 
available places over the period of the measure. They calculated values from the 1948/49 to 
2007/08 seasons (inclusive) and for ten year intervals. Their findings suggested that 
competitive balance in the English top league has decreased and that the league is in danger 
of becoming a monopoly of the few. Our study examines this issue further by considering 
whether or not the FFP regulations are assisting the maintaining of certain monopolies by a 
select number of clubs across the major European leagues. 
 The contrasting nature of these findings means that there is an area of disagreement 
amongst academics in relation to competitive balance. For example, Pawlowski (2013) states 
that it may be that the empirical evidence is 'wrong' because the proxies used to measure 
competitive balance are inadequate. Indeed, the measurement of competitive balance has a 
long history of competing methods (Freestone and Manoli, 2017; Martinez and Willner, 
2017). There is also an academic argument that competitive balance is not as important as 
previously suggested in past studies (e.g. Andreff and Scelles, 2015; Pawlowski and Anders, 
2012; Scelles, Durand, Bonnal, Goyeau and Andreff, 2013) but these papers focus more on 
analysing competitive balance against the concept of UoH and fan attendance. 
Financial Fair Play Regulations 
  
The dynamics of competition in club football have led to a situation where wealth is one of 
the most important competitive drivers (Franck, 2010; Freestone and Manoli, 2017). 
Arguably, this is nothing new; financial resources have always been integral to the success of 
football clubs historically, although the situation became exacerbated around the mid-2000s 
due to two factors in particular. First, a significant number of football clubs across Europe 
were financially unstable. Many individual clubs had unsustainable debt levels and numerous 
academics cited a 'financial crisis' across many European football leagues including France 
(Andreff, 2007), Spain (Ascari and Gagnepain, 2007), Portugal (Barros, 2006), England 
(Buraimo, Simmons and Syzmanski, 2006) and Germany (Dietl and Franck, 2007).  
 However, despite this scenario, very few football clubs actually went into 
administration and ceased to exist, something which could conceivably happen if a 'normal' 
business was consistently recording high-losses. This is partly due to the recognised ideal that 
the survival of football clubs is viewed as highly desirable in a wider social context which 
means that there is reluctance, particularly among state creditors, to liquidate a football club 
(Freestone and Manoli, 2017). It is this unique position of power that football clubs hold that 
leads us to the second significant factor. This factor has been termed by some commentators 
as 'financial doping' and concerns the practice of relying on significant funding from external 
benefactors in order to cover perpetual losses, thus gaining a financial advantage over the 
competition (Muller, Lammert and Hovemann, 2012). Again, this is not necessarily a new 
phenomenon (wealthy benefactors have often propped-up football clubs financially), yet it 
has taken greater precedence over the last twenty years as the amount of money coming into 
the game has increased. As such, these external benefactors have also been referred to as 
'sugar daddies' and have invested enormous sums of money to the clubs that they have 
acquired an interest in, typically in the pursuit of prestige and sporting success and with little 
or no regard for the financial losses that such endeavours required (Lang, Grossman and 
  
Theiler, 2011). The application of the term 'doping' in this context is indicative of clubs' 
attempts to gain an illegitimate advantage through the artificial manipulation of the natural 
competitiveness inherent in sport (Schubert and Konecke, 2015, Freestone and Manoli, 
2017). Whether or not such a powerful term as 'financial doping' is required in this context is 
open to debate but evidence does confirm a decline in competitive balance across major 
European football leagues during the last two decades (Ramchandani, Plumley, Boyes and 
Wilson, 2018), a time period that coincides with an increasing amount of revenue and 
external investment in the game. 
 It was against the backdrop of the implications of 'financial doping' that UEFA 
introduced its own FFP regulations, which were designed to regulate the financial behaviour 
of clubs competing in UEFA club competitions (Freestone and Manoli, 2017). It is worth 
noting here that because these regulations only apply to clubs that compete in UEFA 
competitions (a maximum of 235 clubs out of 734 in Europe's top-divisions each season) 
other national associations across Europe (including the EPL and the Football League in 
England for example) have implemented their own versions of FFP regulations in their 
respective league systems (Szymanski, 2014). FFP has two main objectives; the no overdue 
payables rule and the break-even rule (Peeters and Szymanski, 2014). Within the break-even 
rule, there is also a stipulation that losses can be incurred to account for transitions in 
business practice (defined as "acceptable losses"). Presently, the acceptable loss permitted is 
based on a 3-year rolling average and has a cumulative total of €30m for the seasons 2015/16, 
2016/17 and 2017/18 (UEFA, 2015). Various other adaptions of FFP around Europe differ 
slightly in terms of specific details but are all derived from UEFA's FFP regulations and, 
therefore, have the same legal framework (Freestone and Manoli, 2017). 
 However, despite the positive intentions of FFP to bring about financial sustainability 
in European football, the regulations themselves have received a number of criticisms. These 
  
criticisms are centred on: the legality of the FFP (e.g. Long, 2012; Peeters and Szymanski, 
2014; Szymanski, 2014); the impact of FFP on the quality of all teams (e.g. Drut and 
Raballand, 2012; Madden, 2012); the impact that FFP could have on player wages (e.g. Dietl, 
Franck and Lang, 2009; Peeters and Szymanski, 2012; Preuss, Haugen and Schubert, 2014); 
and the fact that FFP actually prevents the industry (and clubs) from benefitting from 
substantial injections of external financing (e.g. Madden, 2012; Franck, 2014). The final 
criticism here is perhaps most pertinent to the paper in respect of what impact the FFP 
regulations may have on competitive balance. Constraining clubs to spend within their means 
is fine in principal (from a business perspective) but this will be dependent on the clubs own 
market potential, meaning a club with a bigger market potential will outperform a club with 
smaller market potential, thus making it difficult for smaller clubs to compete (Lindholm, 
2010; Sass, 2012). The effect of this would be to further cement the existing hierarchy of 
European club football; strengthening the power of the wealthiest clubs by constraining the 
smaller clubs (Sass, 2014; Szymanski, 2014). Vopel (2013, p.17) confirms this point by 
stating that the spending power provides the true competitive advantage in football, making it 
"almost impossible to catch-up to bigger clubs without external funding". The 'big five' 
leagues in European football have historically been characterised by competitive imbalance 
and dominance by a select number of clubs (Ramchandani et al., 2018). 
 These findings are at odds with the theoretical structure of sport leagues in 
professional team sport. FFP was devised to negate a volatile financial situation in the 
European football market. However, we question whether or not the FFP regulations have 
had 'unintended consequences' when it comes to competitive balance. This paper will provide 
empirical evidence against this question by considering competitive balance in the 'big five' 
European football leagues pre and post the implementation of FFP. 
 
  
Methods 
Our research focuses on the top division football leagues in England (English Premier 
League), Germany (Bundesliga), France (Ligue 1), Italy (Serie A) and Spain (La Liga). At 
the time of writing there have been six completed seasons in each of these leagues following 
the formal introduction of FFP regulations in 2011. In order to examine changes in 
competitive balance in each league before and after FPP was introduced, we organised our 
study into two distinct time periods: pre FFP, comprising the six seasons between 2005/06 
and 2010/11; and post-FFP, comprising the six seasons between 2011/12 and 2016/17. 
 There are a variety of measurement techniques used when considering competitive 
balance in professional team sports, which have their respective strengths and weaknesses 
(see Mills and Fort, 2014; Owen and King, 2015). Our analysis utilises Mitchie and 
Oughton's (2004) Herfindahl Index of Competitive Balance (HICB) to measure within-season 
competitive balance which is an industry standard measure adapted from the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index. The rationale for using HICB to measure overall league concentration is 
two-fold. First, it has been used in previous academic research focusing on football leagues 
(see for example, Pawlowski et al., 2010; Plumley et al., 2017); second, it allows 
comparisons between leagues, with a different number of teams and, within leagues when the 
number of teams changes over time. HICB scores were calculated using the following 
formula: 
(HHI / (1/n)) x 100      (1) 
where HHI is the sum of the squares of the points share for each club contesting a league in a 
given season and n is the number of teams in that particular league and season.  For a 
perfectly balanced league of any size, the index takes a value of 100. As the index rises, 
competitive balance declines. 
  
 Our research also examined specific aspects of competitive balance that are likely to 
be of interest to both fans and league authorities: competition for the title and competition for 
survival. Our approach to this analysis utilises the methods proposed by Plumley et al. (2017) 
in their analysis of the English football league system. For all five leagues, competition for 
the title was measured using the formula: 
TG = PPM1 - ((PPM2 + PPM3 +PPM4)/3)     (2) 
where TG is the title gap between the points per match won by the team finishing first 
(PPM1) and the average points per match won by other likely title contenders, who were 
judged to be the teams that finished second (PPM2), third (PPM3) and fourth (PPM4).  
To investigate the competition for survival, we used the following formula to compare the 
average points per match of the teams ranked in the bottom three places in each league with 
the equivalent number of teams that finished immediately above them in the league: 
SG = ((PPMn-3 + PPMn-4+ PPMn-5)/3) - ((PPMn + PPMn-1+ PPMn-2)/3)  (3) 
where SG is the survival gap, PPM is points match of a team and n refers to the total number 
of teams in each league. For example, in the EPL, n is equal to 20, so n-1 equals 19, n-2 
equals 18 and so on. 
 An independent sample t-test was used to establish whether the differences in the 
competitive balance scores for HICB, title gap and survival gap in each league before and 
after FFP were statistically significant. A further piece of analysis, informed by previous 
research by Syzmanski and Kuypers (1999) and by Curran, Jennings and Sedgwick (2009), 
was to examine the levels of dominance in each league pre FFP and post-FFP including the 
number of different teams to win the league title and the number of different teams to finish 
in the top four positions. 
 
  
Results  
HICB 
Figure 1 shows the mean HCB scores for each league for the six seasons immediately prior to 
the implementation of FFP (from 2005/06 to 2010/11) and for the six seasons immediately 
following the implementation of FFP (from 2011/12 to 2016/17). For all five leagues the 
post-FFP mean HICB score was found to be higher than their pre-FFP mean HICB score. The 
variation between the pre and post-FFP mean HICB scores appears to be most prominent for 
Spain and least pronounced for England. An independent samples t-test confirmed that the 
mean difference in HICB scores pre and post-FFP was statistically significant for Spain (t(10) 
= -3.235, p = 0.009), Germany (t(10 = -2.740, p = 0.021) and France (t(10) = -2.244, p = 
0.049) but not for England (t(10 = -.340, p = 0.767) and Italy (t(10 = -.868, p = 0.406). 
<Figure 1 about here> 
Title and survival gap 
For each league examined pre and post-FFP, Figure 2 shows the difference in the points 
achieved by the team that won the league title and the average number of points achieved by 
the teams that finished in second, third and fourth place (i.e. title gap). This difference is 
expressed on a 'points per match' basis to facilitate a better comparison between the different 
European leagues. For example, each team in the EPL contests 38 matches whereas those in 
the Bundesliga contest 34 matches. Lower gap scores in Figure 2 indicate better competition 
for the title. For the pre and post-FFP time periods, Figure 2 also shows the absolute gap 
between the average points per match achieved by the bottom three teams in each league and 
the average points per match achieved by the equivalent number of teams finishing 
immediately above them (i.e. survival gap).  
<Figure 2 about here> 
  
At face value, there has been in increase in the title gap in all five leagues in the post-FFP 
period accompanied by an increase in the survival gap for three leagues. However, with the 
exception of the pre and post-FFP title gap for Germany (t(10) = -4.150, p = 0.02), no 
significant differences were detected (p > 0.05) for the other leagues by an independent 
sample t-test.  
Dominance 
Table 1 presents the different teams that have won the domestic league title and the title-
winning frequency of each team pre and post-FFP. Based on this data, in Figure 3 we have 
plotted the number of different teams in each of the five leagues to have won their domestic 
league title during the six seasons between 2005/06 and 2010/11 (pre-FFP) on the horizontal 
axis against the corresponding figure for each league during the six seasons between 2011/12 
and 2016/17 (post FFP) on the vertical axis. The axes intersect at the median scores for the 
pre and post-FFP time periods (3 in each time period). 
<Table 1 about here> 
<Figure 3 about here> 
It can be seen that five different teams won the domestic league title in Germany in the pre-
FFP period, which reduced to just two in period following the implementation of FFP. An 
increase in dominance of one or a few teams is also evident in the case of the domestic 
leagues in Italy (3 league title winners pre FFP v 1 post FFP) and France (4 pre FFP v 3 post 
FFP). Conversely, in the case of England and to a lesser extent Spain, there appears to have 
been a reduction in dominance for the league title with more teams winning the domestic title 
in these leagues in the post-FFP period. 
 If we broaden our analysis to consider the dominance for the top four positions in 
each league (see Table 2 and Figure 4), then we find improvements in Spain (+2), England 
  
(+1) and Italy  (+1) by virtue of more teams securing a top four finish in these leagues post-
FFP. Two fewer teams finished in the top four positions in Germany post-FFP. There was no 
change noted in the case of France, with Ligue 1 continuing to be the least dominant relative 
to the other European leagues examined. 
<Table 2 about here> 
<Figure 4 about here> 
Discussion 
Our results provide mixed findings in relation to the 'big five' leagues in European football in 
a post-FFP climate but they do reveal some interesting discussion points regarding 
competitive balance in European football post-FFP. Descriptively, all leagues have seen a 
decline in competitive balance post-FFP. Furthermore, this decline is statistically significant 
for the leagues in Spain, Germany and France - although the French league still has better 
levels of competitive balance in relation to the rest. For England and Italy, there is no 
significant difference in the levels of competitive balance pre and post-FFP. In respect of 
England, our findings are in line with Freestone and Manoli (2017) who found no indication 
that the FFP regulations have resulted in a decline in competitive balance in the EPL, instead 
hinting that a positive effect may have been caused. Our results, however, do not confirm this 
positive link, with evidence suggesting that the overall balance of the league has declined but 
not significantly when analysed statistically. Furthermore, the decline in competitive across 
all five European leagues is indicative of past research in the field, confirming the findings of 
a number of authors including Goossens (2006), Groot (2008), Montes et al. (2014), Plumley 
et al. (2017) and Ramchandani et al. (2018). 
 In relation to competition for the title, survival and measures of dominance, our 
results again point to mixed evidence. All five leagues have seen an increase in the gap for 
  
the title race, indicating that whichever club(s) are winning the league are winning by bigger 
points margins. Additionally, for Italy, France and Germany, the number of different title 
winners has decreased since the advent of FFP. Germany was also the only league to see a 
reduction in the different number of teams that finished in the top four positions post-FFP. 
 The standout discussion point in our results is the case of the German Bundesliga. In 
relation to all our measures of analysis, the Bundesliga performed poorly and saw a 
significant decline in competitive balance and a significant increase in the gap for the title as 
well as seeing fewer title winners and fewer clubs finishing in the top four positions in total. 
In this case, the standout performer (from a sporting perspective) was Bayern Munich (5 title 
wins and 6 top four finishes in 6 seasons post-FFP) whilst the rest struggled to match their 
dominance. It can be argued from the data that Bayern Munich are creating a monopoly in 
German football, similar to what Curran et al. (2009) suggested was happening in English 
football with a select number of clubs, and certainly something which goes against the 
fundamental premise of competition in professional team sports (Dobson and Goddard, 
2011). 
 The findings for Germany are also interesting given the ownership structure of clubs 
in Germany and the 50+1 rule. Indeed, associations (Verein in German) hold 50% plus one 
voting right of any football club company, which then limits the power of clubs financiers 
(Dietl and Franck, 2007). This system means that, historically, German clubs have been 
averse to financial takeovers and whilst from a positive perspective this means that clubs are 
unlikely to accumulate debts over a long period (especially since its indebtedness capacity is 
low) (Franck, 2010) it can also be to the detriment of clubs that are trying to improve their 
performance within such a system as they cannot catch-up to the bigger clubs without 
external funding (Vopel, 2013). 
  
 A case in point here is the situation of RB Leipzig, who has circumvented some of 
this regulation in Germany to a certain extent. Leipzig was only founded in 2009 when Red 
Bull (the energy drinks company that own the club) acquired the license of a now-obsolete 
fifth-tier club. Since then, Leipzig secured four promotions in seven years to join Germany's 
top flight in 2016/17, consequently finishing second and qualifying for the UEFA Champions 
League. However, the latest figures available show that Leipzig owe Red Bull €83m (Word 
Soccer Talk, 2018) and there have been suggestions as to whether or not the club is acting 
within the spirit and ethos of the league in regards to ownership structure. Irrespective of this, 
it is a clear example of Vopel's (2013) point surrounding the necessity of external funding in 
football clubs to catch the established elite. Interesting, at the time of writing, the German 
clubs have decided to retain the 50+1 rule after there were discussions about relaxing the 
regulations to spur outside investment (First Post, 2018) despite the CEO of the DFL stating 
that he finds the rule 'a little excessive'. The role of external investors here is also particularly 
important in this context with reference to the extant literature surrounding 'sugar daddies' 
(Lang, Grossman and Theiler, 2011). These external investors/benefactors have had a 
significant impact in some European football leagues in recent years (in particular the EPL) 
and have invested enormous sums of money to the clubs that they have acquired an interest 
in, something which may also have impacted on club financial performance in both pre and 
post-FFP climates. 
 Whilst we cannot obviously claim causation in respect of FFP in the context of our 
results, we can partially attribute a decline in competitive balance to the sizeable financial 
gap that has developed between clubs during this period, caused in part by increases in prize 
money, primarily generated by income received from broadcasting contracts in respective 
leagues and through pan-European competitions such as the UEFA Champions League 
(Pawlowski et at., 2010). Despite some of the broadcasting distributions offering shared 
  
revenue for certain proportions of the deal across individual leagues, there is no true revenue 
sharing across European team sports. This leads to a situation whereby the wealthiest and 
most successful clubs continue to earn a significant share of that income stream, to the 
detriment of other clubs in the league (Szymanski and Kesenne, 2004; Lee and Fort, 2012). 
With reference to Germany and Spain (two leagues where there has been a significant decline 
in competitive balance post-FFP) both have just moved to a more collective distribution of 
their broadcasting rights amongst clubs whereas previously clubs were free to negotiate their 
own rights (meaning that Barcelona and Real Madrid in Spain and Bayern Munich in 
Germany were able to hold monopoly power in relation to broadcasting income). In contrast, 
the EPL has one of the most equal broadcasting distribution mechanisms to clubs and this 
league has not seen a significant change in competitive balance for the time period studied. It 
is too early to tell at this stage whether or not a move to a more collective distribution will 
benefit the competitive balance of these leagues (Germany and Spain) and future research is 
needed in this area once the figures become available. Additionally, we have not empirically 
tested for competitive balance against TV deals and subscriptions so it is important not to 
generalise here and recognise that there are also other potential factors at play. 
 The aims of the FFP regulations laid out earlier in the study provide some interesting 
reflection points and questions for further discussion in light of our findings. As suggested in 
some of the figures provided by Deloitte (2017) in their Annual Review of Football Finance 
publication, the regulations appear to be having an impact, generally speaking, on financial 
health. However, whilst we cannot say that FFP is causal, because of significant other factors 
being at play, our results do indicate a general decline in competitive balance for the big five 
European leagues since the introduction of the regulations. With this in mind, and given that 
FFP limits the losses a club can make and external investment into the club, how are the 
smaller clubs ever going to close the gap to the bigger clubs both financially and on the 
  
pitch? Will the regulations, in their current format, only serve to maintain the status quo in 
European football? We have provided statistical evidence that this may be the case for some 
of these leagues in a post-FFP climate, in particular the German Bundesliga. 
Conclusion 
This study set out to analyse the level of competitive balance in the 'big five' European 
football leagues by measuring the six seasons post-implementation and the six seasons prior 
to the regulations being introduced. There have been a number of criticisms levelled at FFP in 
past academic papers, particularly in relation to competitive balance and the preservation of 
the status quo of the wealthy elite clubs (Sass, 2014; Szymanski, 2014). The results from this 
study, in part, provide evidence to support such claims, particularly in the context of the elite 
leagues in Germany, Spain and France. Furthermore, under the current regulations it will also 
be difficult for any of the 'smaller' clubs to close this gap given that the regulations limit 
significant external investment. Thus, clubs must look to other long-term financing strategies 
or innovation in their strategic direction to be able to compete. However, innovation and 
long-term financing will only get you so far in respect of the revenue that you can actually 
generate. Under a break-even principle, the clubs that earn more will ultimately always have 
more to spend. There is no doubt that FFP was introduced with good intentions but it may 
have had an unintended consequence in relation to the competitive balance of European 
football leagues. 
 Our study is the first of its kind to test for changes in competitive balance in domestic 
European football leagues post-FFP. However, it is premature to draw definitive conclusions 
at this stage for three reasons. First, our analysis indicates mixed evidence of changes in CB 
in terms of the five leagues analysed. Second, in leagues where there has been a significant 
decline in CB, a causal link with FFP cannot be established with certainty. Third, given that 
there are 54 domestic top-division football leagues in Europe, we feel that it is difficult to 
  
provide definitive implications towards UEFA at this stage without investigating changes in 
CB across all European leagues. 
 There are a number of future research recommendations that will help provide more 
empirical evidence on this topic area. First, it is necessary to obtain a full European picture on 
competitive balance, incorporating all national football associations that make up UEFA. 
This would allow for a full industry picture and it would allow conclusions to be drawn about 
the potential wealth gap between the 'big five' leagues in Europe and the rest. Second, it 
would be useful to analyse the data on competitive balance alongside the financial health of 
European football clubs both pre and post-FFP given the two primary objectives of the 
regulations. This would enable us to see whether or not the regulations are doing what they 
set out to do in practice. A third potential area for future research is to replicate this study and 
the additional areas above focusing solely on the UEFA Champions League and UEFA 
Europa League (and the clubs within it) to see whether or not there has been a change in the 
competitive balance of this competition. This would enable like-for-like comparisons in 
relation to the regulations as all clubs that compete in these competitions (235 each season) as 
they would all have to conform to the UEFA FFP regulations. Further research into the 
impact of FFP on the European football industry is paramount moving forward both in 
relation to understanding the changing business models of clubs in this climate and how this 
can manifest into maintaining healthy competition between clubs in individual league 
structures. 
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Figure 1: Mean HICB scores by league pre and post FFP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Figure 2: Title and survival gap by league pre and post-FFP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Table 1: Teams winning the domestic league title by league pre and post FFP  
League Team Pre FFP Post FFP 
Premier League Manchester United 4 1 
Premier League Chelsea 2 2 
Premier League Manchester City 0 2 
Premier League Leicester City 0 1 
Bundesliga Bayern Munich 2 5 
Bundesliga Borussia Dortmund 1 1 
Bundesliga VfB Stuttgart 1 0 
Bundesliga VfL Wolfsburg 1 0 
Bundesliga Werder Breman 1 0 
Ligue 1 Lyon 3 0 
Ligue 1 Bordeaux 1 0 
Ligue 1 Lille 1 0 
Ligue 1 Marseille 1 0 
Ligue 1 Paris Saint-Germain 0 4 
Ligue 1 Monaco 0 1 
Ligue 1 Montpellier 0 1 
La Liga Barcelona 4 3 
La Liga Real Madrid 2 2 
La Liga Atletico Madrid 0 1 
Serie A Inter Milan 4 0 
Serie A Juventus 1 6 
Serie A AC Milan  1 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Figure 3: Number of different teams to have won the domestic league title (pre FFP v post 
FFP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Table 2: Teams securing a top four place by league pre and post FFP  
League Team Pre 
FFP 
Post 
FFP 
League Team Pre 
FFP 
Post 
FFP 
Premier League Arsenal 6 5 La Liga Barcelona 6 6 
Premier League Chelsea 6 4 La Liga Real Madrid 6 6 
Premier League Manchester United 6 3 La Liga Valencia 4 2 
Premier League Liverpool 4 2 La Liga Sevilla 3 1 
Premier League Manchester City 1 6 La Liga Atletico Madrid 2 5 
Premier League Tottenham 1 3 La Liga Villarreal 2 1 
Premier League Leicester City 0 1 La Liga Osasuna 1 0 
Bundesliga Bayern Munich 5 6 La Liga Athletic Bilbao 0 1 
Bundesliga Schalke 04 4 3 La Liga Malaga 0 1 
Bundesliga Werder Breman 4 0 La Liga Real Sociedad 0 1 
Bundesliga Bayer Leverkusen 2 4 Serie A Inter Milan 6 1 
Bundesliga VfL Wolfsburg 2 1 Serie A AC Milan  5 2 
Bundesliga Hamburg SV 2 0 Serie A Fiorentina 4 3 
Bundesliga VfB Stuttgart 2 0 Serie A Juventus 3 6 
Bundesliga Borussia Dortmund 1 5 Serie A AS Roma 3 4 
Bundesliga Hannover 96 1 0 Serie A Napoli 1 4 
Bundesliga Hertha Berlin 1 0 Serie A Udinese 1 1 
Bundesliga Borussia 
Monchengladbach 
0 3 Serie A Sampdoria 1 0 
Bundesliga 1899 Hoffenheim 0 1 Serie A Lazio 0 2 
Bundesliga RB Leipzig 0 1 Serie A Atalanta 0 1 
Ligue 1 Lyon 6 5     
Ligue 1 Marseille 5 2     
Ligue 1 Lille 3 2     
Ligue 1 Bordeaux 3 0     
Ligue 1 Toulouse 2 0     
Ligue 1 Paris Saint-Germain 1 6     
Ligue 1 AJ Auxerre 1 0     
Ligue 1 AS Nancy Lorraine 1 0     
Ligue 1 Lens 1 0     
Ligue 1 Stade Rennes 1 0     
Ligue 1 Monaco 0 4     
Ligue 1 Nice 0 3     
Ligue 1 Montpellier 0 1     
Ligue 1 St Etienne 0 1     
 
 
 
 
  
  
Figure 4: Number of different teams to have finished in the top four league positions (pre FFP 
v post FFP) 
 
Note: The axes intersect at the median HICB scores for the two time periods (8 pre FFP and 9 
post FFP). 
 
 
